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ABSTRACT
Content polluters, or bots that hijack a conversation for political
or advertising purposes are a known problem for event prediction,
election forecasting and when distinguishing real news from fake
news in social media data. Identifying this type of bot is particularly
challenging, with state-of-the-art methods utilising large volumes
of network data as features for machine learning models. Such
datasets are generally not readily available in typical applications
which stream social media data for real-time event prediction. In
this work we develop a methodology to detect content polluters in
social media datasets that are streamed in real-time. Applying our
method to the problem of civil unrest event prediction in Australia,
we identify content polluters from individual tweets, without col-
lecting social network or historical data from individual accounts.
We identify some peculiar characteristics of these bots in our dataset
and propose metrics for identification of such accounts. We then
pose some research questions around this type of bot detection,
including: how good Twitter is at detecting content polluters and
how well state-of-the-art methods perform in detecting bots in our
dataset.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Bots and content polluters in online social media affect the socio-
political state of the world, from meddling in elections [4, 13, 37]
to influencing US veterans [15]. In late September 2017, Twitter
admitted to Congress that it had found 200 Russian accounts that
overlapped with Facebook accounts which were used to sway Amer-
icans and create divisions during the elections held in 2016 [37]. Of
course, some bots are useful as well, for instance accounts that will
tweet alerts to people about natural disasters. The problem arises
when they try to influence people or spread misinformation. The
importance of detecting bots in online social media has produced
an active research area on this topic [9, 21].
State-of-the-art methods for bot detection use historical patterns
of behaviour and a rich feature set including textual, temporal, and
social network features, to distinguish automated bots from real
human users [35]. However, for real-time application using large
streamed datasets, such methods can be prohibitive due to the sheer
volume, velocity, and incompleteness of data samples. In this work
we develop a new method to detect one particular type of social
bot – content polluters – in streamed microblog datasets such as
Twitter. Content polluters are bots that attempt to subvert a genuine
discussion by hijacking it for political or advertising purposes. As
we will show, these bots are a major concern for applications such
as real-time event prediction, such as social unrest, from social
media datasets.
1.2 Problem context
Social unrest prediction is a growing concern for governments
worldwide. This is evidenced by DARPA’s Open Source Intelligence
program, which produced numerous methods to predict the occur-
rence of future population-level events such as civil unrest, political
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crises, election outcomes and disease outbreaks [12, 25, 30, 32]. It
has been observed that social events are either preceded or fol-
lowed by changes in population-level communication behaviour,
consumption and movement. A large fraction of population-level
changes are implicitly reflected in online data such as blogs, online
social networks, financial markets, or search queries. Some of these
data sources have been shown to effectively detect population-level
events in real time. Methods have been developed for predicting
such events by fusing publicly available data from multiple sources.
There exists a plethora of research focused on social media-based
forecasting models, suggesting that features from micro-blogs such
as Twitter can predict and detect population-level events [30]. Once
one develops a “gold standard" (ground truth) record of known
events (e.g. election results, or protests occurring) models can be
trained using open source data to make predictions. A significant
challenge for such models is noise reduction through filtering “fake
news”, removingmisclassified or irrelevant tweets, or mitigating the
effects of missing data. This is of particular concern, as the changing
limits on accessing social media data remains a major challenge for
researchers [26]. Access to data through APIs and third parties can
be inconsistent, incomplete, and corrupted by noise in the form of
bots. Where bots are influencing people through fake social media
accounts, they also act as content polluters on social media sites [33].
According to the Digital Forensics Research Lab (DFRL), “They can
make a group of six people look like a group of 46,000 people."
The main goal of our work was finding out content polluters
in a dataset comprising tweets related to Australian social unrest
events in real time, without access to complete profile information
of the users. Due to rate limits on the public API and the high
cost of accessing data, we were restricted to using only streamed
tweets satisfying certain criteria. While the actual event prediction
algorithm is not the primary concern of this paper, further detail
can be found in Osborne et al. [29].
1.3 Related Work
A social bot is a computer algorithm that automatically produces
content and interacts with humans on social media, trying to em-
ulate and possibly alter their behaviour [14]. Social bots inhabit
social media platforms, and online social networks are inundated
by millions of bots exhibiting increasingly sophisticated, human-
like behaviour. In the coming years a proliferation of social media
bots is expected as advertisers, criminals, politicians, governments,
terrorists, and other organizations attempt to influence populations
[34]. This introduces dimensions for social bots, including social
network characteristics, temporal activity, diffusion patterns, and
sentiment expression [14].
Ghost et al. [16] conducted an analysis on the follower/followee
links acquired by over 40,000 spammer accounts suspended by Twit-
ter. They showed that penalizing users for connecting to spammers
can be effective because it would de-incentivize users from linking
with other users in order to gain influence. Yang et al. [40] found
that bot accounts in online social networks connect to each other
by chance and integrate into the social network just like normal
users. Network information along with content has been shown to
detect spam in online social networks [20]. While researchers were
proposing various bot-detection models, Lee et al. [24] identified
and engaged strangers on social media to effectively propagate
information/misinformation. They proposed a model to leverage
peoples’ social behaviour (online interactions) and users’ wait times
for retweeting.
Social bots evolve over time, making them resilient against stan-
dard bot detection approaches [9]. They are apt at changing discus-
sion topics and posting activities [38]. Researchers have proposed
complex models, such as those based on interaction graphs of suspi-
cious accounts [19, 20, 22, 39]. An adversary often controls multiple
social bots known as a sybil. One strategy to detect such accounts
relies on investigating social graph structure, on the assumption
that sybil accounts link to a small number of legitimate users [7].
Behavioural patterns and sentiments analysis have also been used
for bot detection [11]. Such patterns can easily be encoded in fea-
tures, thus machine learning techniques can be used to distinguish
bot-like from human-like behaviour. Previous work uses network-
based features or content analysis for bot detection, along with
indicators such as temporal activity, retweets, and crowd sourcing
[10, 36]. Such efforts require substantial network knowledge or the
ability to quickly query an API for a complete history of social
media postings by suspected bots. However, real-time applications,
such as streaming messages based on keywords or geographic lo-
cations, render this impractical. A major challenge therefore is
developing methodologies to detect and remove bots based on par-
tial information, message histories, and network knowledge, in real
time.
In this work we detect bots from individual tweets downloaded
for predicting social unrest in Australian cities. Given filters on
keywords and geographic location of events (such as protests, ral-
lies, civil disturbances) collected in real time, it leaves a small but
informative dataset for prediction. Predictions are generated in real
time by analysing data from online social media platforms such as
Twitter and validated against hand-labeled “Gold standard records”
(GSR) [29]. The GSR is created by the news analysts; after going
through a validation and cleaning process this data is ready to be
used as the ground truth. If Twitter data is contaminated with so-
cial bots, it can greatly degrade prediction models. It is therefore
imperative to develop techniques for detecting and removing social
bots for real-time data streams.
Contributions: Our scientific contributions are as follows:
(1) We develop amethod to identify social bots in data using only
partial information about the user and their tweet history,
in real time.
(2) We present a new dataset of hand-labelled bots and legiti-
mate records, and use it to validate our method1.
(3) We pose a set of research questions for evaluating whether
Twitter users, Twitter, or existing state-of-the-art bot detec-
tion methods could detect bots in our dataset or not.
1.4 Dataset
Our dataset consists of timestamped tweets from 1 January 2015 till
31 December 2016 from 5 major capital cities in Australia. Tweets
identify one of the following locations: ‘Australia’, ‘Adelaide’, ‘Bris-
bane’, ‘Melbourne’, ‘Perth’, or ‘Sydney’. The data are targeted at
studying civil unrest and intends to capture ways in which people
1Data can be accessed on http://maths.adelaide.edu.au/mehwish.nasim/
Table 1: Data statistics
Parameters Adelaide Brisbane Melbourne Perth Sydney
Number of tweets 14087 5913 23720 8421 31568
Number of unique users 12039 3466 14611 6215 14515
Number of unique URLs 548 233 762 456 844
Average number of followers (in degree) 8812 9624 6733 5409 6052
Average number friends (out degree) 1223 1736 1517 1643 1860
Number of verified accounts 293 432 840 209 412
express opinions and organize marches, rallies, peaceful/violent
protests etc., within Australia. Such events aim to draw attention
toward an issue e.g., infrastructure, taxes, immigration laws etc.
Australia has a population of about 24.5 million people and, like
in many developed countries, predicting civil unrest events is of
interest to law enforcement agencies, government bodies, media
and academia. Notwithstanding this fact, the literature is devoid
of exploratory studies conducted on this population for real-time
prediction of civil unrest events. The basic statistics about protest-
related tweets in our dataset are reported in Table 1.
Note that the dataset was devoid of information on the alters (fol-
lowers/friends of egos), except for the total count of alters (numbers
of followers and friends).
2 DETECTING CONTENT POLLUTERS
We investigate two characteristics of tweets i.e., temporal informa-
tion and message diversity in a tweet.
Temporal Patterns: In the first step we were interested in 1).
users who tweet frequently, 2). pairs of users who tweet on the
same day using the desired keywords. Since no information about
the network of individual users is available, we cannot construct a
follower-friend network graph. Instead, we construct a two mode
user-event network. For all the events in the data we connect two
users if they have tweeted on the same event day. We represent
this problem in graph theoretic terms as follows:
Let G be a bipartite graph of users and events. Let U be the
set of users and let V be the set of events. Let u,v ∈ U and let
i, j ∈ V . For any i ∈ V if N (u) ∩ N (v) , {} then (u,v) ∈ E in
the one-mode projection of the bipartite graph. The neighbourhood
N (v) of a vertex v ∈ U is the set of vertices that are adjacent to
v . The resulting projection is an undirected loopless multigraph.
If the edge set E contains the same edge several times, then E is
a multiset. If an edge occurs several times in E, the copies of that
edge are called parallel edges. Graphs that have parallel edges are
also called multigraphs.
Similar to other social networks such as friendship networks,
event networks are a result of complex sociological processes with
a multitude of relations. When such relations are conflated into
a dense network, the visualization often resembles a “hairball”.
Various approaches to declutter drawings of such networks exist
in the literature. We use the recent backbone layout approach for
network visualization [28], which accounts for strong ties (or mul-
tiplicity of edges) and uses the union of all maximum spanning
trees as a sparsifier to ensure a connected subgraph. In Figure 1b,
the thickness of edges represents how often a pair of nodes tweet
(a) Two purple nodes at the right side that are loosely con-
nected to the core, are bots. They have tweeted together fre-
quently and their individual frequency to tweet is low as com-
pared to other nodes in the graph, however the dyadic (pair-
wise) frequency is higher.
(b) Two densely connected components in the tweets graph.
Figure 1: Graphs containing bots and legitimate users from
the Melbourne events network.
on the same ’event day’2 whereas, the size of the nodes indicates
the individual frequency of tweets by a user3. We noticed that bots
tweeted together frequently. Their individual frequency to tweet is
2Event day was confirmed from the GSR.
3Networks visualizations are created in visone (http://www.visone.info/).
Figure 2: Graph containing bots and legitimate users from
the Melbourne events network.
low as compared to other nodes in the graph, however the dyadic
(pairwise) frequency is higher. For instance, the two purple nodes
on the right have tweeted together frequently, in Figure 1a. Their
individual frequency to tweet is low as compared to other nodes
in the graph, however the dyadic (pairwise) frequency is higher.
These two nodes are weakly connected to the core. Upon checking
their complete profiles, the users were found to be political bots.
This motivated us to further explore the tweets-graph.
The core of the network (green nodes) were found to be news
channels and popular blogs in Australia, such as MelbLiveNews,
newsonaust, 7NewsMelbourne and LoversMelbourne to name a few.
Media accounts are likely to report population-level events on the
day of the events, thus they form a strongly-connected core of the
events network graph.
We then clustered all tweets in a similar manner to construct a
graph where two users have an edge between them if they have
tweeted on the same day, irrespective of whether there was an event
that day or not. We used the Louvain Method for clustering the
network [5], based on the concept of modularity. Optimizing the
modularity results in the best possible grouping of nodes in a given
network. We then found two strongly-connected components in
the graph: 1. News channels, and 2. Bots. We analysed the strongly-
connected vertex-induced subgraphs from the network. One such
component for the city ofMelbourne is shown in Figure 2, which is a
strongly-connected component from Figure 1b. Bots are the purple
nodes (validated by manual inspection of profiles). Green nodes
represent false positives. Orange nodes are not bots but are also not
relevant for predictions, since these users were not geographically
located in Australia and were tweeting about Victoria in the UK.
Message diversity: We computed the diversity in the tweets
based upon mentions of URLs and hashtags. We selected the top
most tweeted URLs, {K} (|K | = 20), and then filtered out the users
(U¯ ⊆ U ) who mentioned those URLs. The motivation for this ap-
proach is that an event prediction model should be resilient against
bot-URLs that are infrequently mentioned in the tweets, so these
will not greatly impact the prediction accuracy. We then computed
the following three measures for each of the remaining users: i).
total number of tweets containing any URL(s), ualli , ii). number of
tweets mentioning URL k ∈ K , uki and iii). diversity score i.e., the
difference between the two measures, udi = u
all
i − uki .
We then plot the diversity score distribution for every uk ∈ U¯ ,
for every URL k ∈ K . This immediately provides some relevant
insights about the behaviour of content polluters: Figure 3a shows a
legitimate URL (i.e., linked to by legitimate users), whereas, Figures
3b and 3c show bot-URLs (i.e., URLs linked to by bots). Users who
tweet these URLs are classified as potential bots. The figures show
that the diversity of users linking to legitimate URLs is generally
far greater than those linking to bot-URLs. The temporal patterns
of bot-URL mentions and those which are being tweeted at regular
intervals indicated that these users were indeed bots.
We measure the extent of diversity in two ways:
(1) The Gini coefficient (G ∈ R, G=[0,1]):
G =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 |udi − udj |
2n
∑n
i=1 u
d
i
, (1)
where n is the number of users tweeting a particular URL.
The Gini coefficient G describes the relative amount of in-
equality in the distribution of diversity: G = 0 indicates
complete equality whileG = 1 indicates complete inequality.
A highG suggests coordination among the observations. The
Gini coefficient does not measure absolute inequality and
the interpretation can vary from situation to situation. Le-
gitimate accounts such as news channels, newspapers, and
famous activists are likely to tweet legitimate and diverse
URLs, thus the Gini coefficient for legitimate URLs is high
as compared to illegitimate URLs. The Gini coefficient for a
sample of ten URLs is shown in Figure 4.
(2) Rank-size Rule: We observed that only a fraction of URLs
are mentioned very frequently in the tweets and very large
number of URLs barely find their way in more than a single
tweet. It is interesting to note that cities and their rank also
follow a similar distribution; this pattern is generally known
as the rank-size rule [31]. This has also been observed in
various studies on calling behaviour of users [2][3] [27].
We fit a curve on every user versus URL-diversity graph and
measure the coefficient of determination R2. Values close to zero
indicate that the model explains little of the variability of the re-
sponse data around its mean. For legitimate URLs, we obtained
values close to 1 (Figure 3).
Recently, Gilani et al. [18] evaluated the characteristics of auto-
mated versus human accounts by looking at complete tweet his-
tories. They initially hypothesized that bots tweet a number of
different URLs, however in the actual data they found that humans
may also post a number of URLs. Conversely, in this work we looked
at most frequently posted URLs and then for each URL we analysed
how diverse the users’ tweets are who are tweeting that URL.
We detected 849 bots in the data using message diversity on
URLs, which we call content polluters. These content polluters con-
tributed about 7% of tweets in the data.We computed some statistics
on content polluters versus legitimate users, shown in Figure 5. In
[14], authors argued that social bots tend to have recent accounts
with long names. However, we did not find a significant difference
in our data between content polluters and regular users. The av-
erage account age of content polluters accounts was 2.9 years as
compared to legitimate users which was 4.2 years. This difference
was significant (p < 0.01). This suggests that these particular type
(a) Legitimate (Gini = 0.8, R2 = 0.98) (b) Bots (Gini = 0.32, R2 = 0) (c) Bots (Gini = 0, R2 = 0)
Figure 3: Message diversity measured through 3 URLs for bots and genuine users.
Figure 4: Gini score for ten URLs. High Gini coefficient indi-
cates a legitimate URL. The three URLs with the lowest Gini
coefficients were being tweeted by content-polluting bots.
of bot accounts are relatively old and have remained (potentially)
undetected by Twitter. The length of Twitter names for bots had
on average 11 characters as compared to non-bots that had 12 char-
acters. None of the bots had verified Twitter accounts. A total of
109 political bot accounts were created on 20 February 2014 with
only 12 unique names, a strong indication of being a bot network.
We also found several digital media bot accounts. Such accounts
aim at becoming famous by attracting followers [6]. A set of such
accounts was created on 30 March 2016. This set consisted of 8
accounts with an average friend count of 4099 and follower count
of 1112.
We also explored the dataset from [23] using our algorithm. The
dataset contains more than 600k tweets. The Gini coefficient for
each dataset (bots and non-bots) was around 0.5, hence we remain
inconclusive. The data set from Gilani et al. [18] only consisted
of the number of URLs each user mentioned, therefore it was not
possible to check the relative frequency of any particular URL.
We argue that the nature of content polluting bots makes them
difficult to distinguish in traditional bot-detection datasets. This
motivates our research questions below and the creation of a new
human-validated content-pollution dataset in the next section.
3 CREATING A CONTENT-POLLUTING BOT
DATASET
Given the peculiarities in the bot accounts that we found in our
analysis, we move on to some pertinent research questions.
3.1 Do humans succeed in detecting content
polluters?
We conducted a user study to hand-label a set of Twitter accounts
that contained equal number of content polluters (from our list
obtained in the previous section) and legitimate accounts. We asked
three independent hand-labellers to create the dataset. Users were
first shown several examples of content polluters as well as of
legitimate accounts. All three participants were well versed with
using Twitter. All participants found it very difficult to assess non-
English accounts even with automatic translation.
The participants recorded the following comments:
Participant 1
Domain Knowledge: Advance Twitter User
Comments: “What I’m struggling with is that, the user doesn’t
actually initiates a suspicious tweet. He simply retweets a whole
bunch of content polluting tweets".
Strategy:
• If user has tweeted or retweeted from well known news
spam sites then mark as bot.
• Otherwise look through pattern of tweets, if very spamy
tweet behaviour, for example highly consistent frequency
of tweeting behaviour and tweets are from a single source
then mark as bot.
• See if they regular mention and interact with other twitter
users which indicates a good sign for a regular account.
• Look at profile details and follower and followees ratio
to distinguish if it appears like a regular account or a bot.
Participant 2
Domain Knowledge: Twitter User/Domain Expert
Comments: “This was a really hard task. It is not at all clear what
the difference is between a bot and a human. This is much slower
than labelling individual tweets."
Strategy:
• Look at the twitter account. If the user has tweeted
well-known news spam URLs/services (@convoy, dv.it,
360WISE, mojahedin.org) then mark it as a bot.
• If not, scroll through the account. If I can find some orig-
inal content (e.g., comments on a retweet) then mark it
as a legitimate account.
Participant 2 continued..
• If it always retweets from a single or only a few accounts
then I mark it as a bot.
• Otherwise it comes down to judgement. This includes
things like looking at avatar icons - if all the followers
seem strangely similar (all Anime figures for example,
or all faded pictures), or if it always uses the same non-
twitter link shortener then I mark it as a bot.
• Then there were a set of accounts who all posted the same
content. I only noticed this after a while, so I probably
only caught some of them.
• There are a set of Markov-chain-like accounts (e.g.
1240541203). It can be difficult to distinguish them be-
cause of the messy, non-standard language typical of
many Twitter users, and the limited amount of text to
work from.
Participant 3
Domain Knowledge: Everyday Twitter User
Comments: “ I think there are lots of accounts that are part auto-
matic and potentially part human (e.g., with the annoying “I’ve
gained/lost n followers" tweets), which seems like a challenge. I
tried to work out if these were actually human."
Strategy:
• In each case, I would skim through the tweets. The pres-
ence of coherent original content without a URL sug-
gested that the account was likely human.
• Tweets from recognisable spam sources (e.g. 360WISE)
suggested the account was a bot.
• Overwhelming consistency across tweets suggested a bot
(i.e., every tweet with exactly the same text formatting,
or using the same URL shortener), except when this was
associated with what appeared to be a carefully curated
account for a business.
• For the rest, I looked at profile information, follower
ratios, and the broader content of the tweets and made
the best judgement I could.
We constructed a labelled dataset from this collection by record-
ing where 2 out of the 3 hand-labellers agreed on a classification.
For our content polluter algorithm, we observed that the propor-
tion of observed correct prediction (for both the classes) on this
hand-labelled dataset was 0.57.
We test the following hypothesis: H1a: Our method was able to
find bot/non-bot accounts with greater than 50% accuracy. Hence,
the null hypothesis is: H0: Our method randomly labelled the
bot/non-bot accounts.
After applying a t test we reject the null hypothesis at a signifi-
cance level of α = 0.05 (p = 0.00029).
3.2 How efficient is Twitter in detecting social
bots?
Twitter continuously searches for suspicious accounts, and accounts
that are found to be malicious may be deleted. In this experiment
we studied how many bot accounts Twitter suspended from our
detected bots list. The dataset that we analysed is from 2015/2016
but we conducted this experiment in April 2017, giving us a compre-
hensive set of accounts determined by Twitter to be bots. We used
the Twitter API for this experiment. Given a query for a specific
account, the Twitter API returns an error message if the account is
suspended by Twitter or deleted by the user. It the error code 63 is
returned then it means Twitter has suspended the account, whereas,
error code 50 means the user deleted the account. For active ac-
counts, metadata information about the account is returned. Upon
querying the Twitter API, we found that Twitter had suspended
153 accounts out of the 849 content polluters that we have detected.
3.3 How efficient other methods are for bot
detection?
We also tested the performance of state-of-the-art bot detection
system called Truthy [10], also known as BotOrNot? [35]. It is a
publicly available API service developed by the Indiana University
at Bloomington in May 2014 to evaluate the similarity of a Twitter
account with the known characteristics of social bots. It uses the
complete profile of a user to determine how likely the user account
is to be a bot. BotOrNot? employs a supervised machine-learning
classifier that exploits more than 1000 features from the Twitter
account under investigation. Features are derived based on network
information and tweeting behaviour. The authors state that despite
the fact that the service is specifically designed for detection of
bots, the performance against evolved spambots might be worse
than that was reported in the paper. We queried this service against
our genuine set of bot accounts. Truthy displays scores against
each account. Higher scores mean more bot-like accounts. Figure 6
shows the overall performance of Truthy against our list of bots.
The mean score was 0.55 with a standard error of 0.14. Table 2
shows the performance summary. We remark that for the task of
detecting content polluters our method performs comparably to
Truthy, using only the information of URL diversity at the sampled-
tweet level. We reiterate that we detected content polluter accounts
using message diversity since we did not have access to complete
account information, whereas Truthy exploited features obtained
from the complete user profile and network. However, the aim
of Truthy is much different from what we are trying to achieve.
We utilize single tweets with users’ metadata to filter out bots in
real-time for event prediction.
(a) Account creation time (b) Length of Twitter account name
Figure 5: Characteristics of users. Bots(red) versus Legitimate users(blue)
Table 2: Performance summary of our method versus Truthy. According to Truthy, 65% of the true positives in the user study
were likely to be a bot, whereas, 21% of false positives also had a greater than 0.5 probability to be a bot.
Truthy(µ) Truthy (σ )
True Positives reported by user study 65% 0.556 0.159
False Positives reported by user study 21% 0.392 0.131
Figure 6: Results obtained from Truthy on the complete list
of bots. Please note that the results were obtained after re-
moving the 153 accounts that were suspended by Twitter.
4 DISCUSSION
In this work we discovered social bots in protest-related tweets, us-
ing a stream of sampled Twitter data. Unlike previous bot-detection
studies, our dataset was devoid of network information and de-
tailed tweeting history. We showed the efficacy of a start-of-the-art
Twitter-bot detection technique using complete profile and network
information on our dataset. Further, we analysed the capabilities
of Twitter and naive users in distinguishing bots from legitimate
users. Twitter continuously looks for malicious accounts, which
are deleted. However, this process may be very slow and a num-
ber of accounts remain undetected [1]. It is difficult to track users
who delete their tweets, since Twitter does not provide access to
deleted tweets, or tweets older than 30 days. We show that even in
the presence of complete network information, existing methods
are not apt at detecting content-polluting bots. We argue that for
real-time Twitter streams where it is difficult to obtain detailed
profile information because of constraints on time and scalability,
a cost-effective way is to compute the message diversity of tweets
for each user. A low diversity might indicate suspicious accounts.
The most challenging aspect of this work is to validate results since
user perceptions are not always correct, and standard bot detection
methods are very much prone to misclassification despite using
complete twitter account information [9, 17, 18]. Results from our
user study indicate that our method agrees with the participants
on most accounts that are legitimate. However, there is some dif-
ference in opinion for the bot accounts since it largely involves
human perception of what a bot or a content polluter could be.
For instance, participant-3 indicated that they did not consider an
account to be a bot when this was associated with what appeared
to be a carefully curated account for a business. However, when we
looked into the original tweets, certain users used hashtags such as
‘#melbourne’, while promoting their business that had nothing to
do with the city Melbourne. Participants also indicated that some
accounts seemed to be part automated and potentially part human.
Even advanced Twitter users found distinguishing between bots
and legitimate users a challenging task. Deletion of tweets is a
major issue for traditional bot detection methods. In the case of US
elections, a recent news article says, “Twitter is either unable or
unwilling to retrieve a substantial amount of tweets from bots and
fake users spreading disinformation. Those users, which have been
tied to Russia, have since deleted those tweets" [8]. In the absence
of malicious tweets any validation method is prone to failure.
Performance Improvement: In February 2017 we used our
content-polluters detection methodology in order to improve the
performance of a social media-based predictive model [29]. Users
from a large Australian law enforcement agency provided posi-
tive feedback on improvements in the predictions. We noted that
the model was no longer erroneously predicting events related
to ‘escorts’, which improved model performance noticeably. Fur-
ther, removal of bots also removed 18 non-interesting events in the
month of February, related to lottery ticket sales.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We found that content polluters in this dataset often timed their
tweets together. By analysing the temporal patterns one could
infer the presence of bot accounts. However, we also noticed that
tweets from news channels were also temporally correlated. Using
only temporal methods could lead to misclassification of legitimate
accounts. We also found that bots used a small set of URLs in their
tweets, therefore by finding out the most frequently-used URLs and
computing their relative usage in tweets from the all the unique
users in the dataset, one could successfully detect content polluters.
Our analysis leads us to believe that conventional machine learning
methods may require a number of features and may not be apt at
correctly identifying bots. The bots that we detected in our dataset
helped to remove noise in the data and significantly improved the
performance of prediction models. In future we aim to:
(1) Analyse non-protest related tweets for detecting bots, and
utilise other available relations such as user-event relations,
temporal relations, social interactions etc.
(2) Characterize bots into various categories and explorewhether
some bots could even be useful for civil unrest prediction.
(3) Conduct more user studies with a larger number of partici-
pants, in order to further understand the characteristics of
content polluters.
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